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NOTES AND COMMENTS
-present purpose seems to be to avoid litigation over trivial promises
not based upon any substantial motive.
The law still requires consideration. In its technical sense, as it
is generally thought of, it is something of value given in exchange;
this was the common law idea. It is, in its widest sense, the reason,
inotive or inducement, by which a person is moved to bind himself by
an agreement.12 But the conception of consideration is gradually
broadening and the courts are now enforcing promises, made with-
out any value given for them, to pay debts which are barred by the
Statute of Limitations 3 or discharged in bankruptcy,1 4 as promises
to perform voidable duties.1 5 This same tendency is evidenced by
various other kinds of cases."' And the Uniform Written Obliga-
tions Act is a further example. Section 1 of the Act provides that a
written promise made and signed shall not be unenforceable for want
of consideration, if it contains a statement to the effect that the signor
intends to be legally bound.1 7 This seems to aim to carry out the
intention of the parties as evidenced by the instrument, even in the
absence of consideration.
The inflection; in the instant case, of the language of previous
cases' s clearly shows the broadening of the requirement of consider-
ation in the law of contracts. This trend seems to lead to the logical
conclusion that future cases will support family settlements despite
want of consideration in the usual sense of legal detriment to the
promisee or benefit to the promisor.
MILLS ScoTT BENTON.
Corporations-Negligence of Directors-Right of
Corporate Creditor to Sue
The Supreme Court of North Carolina recently held that plaintiffs,
corporation creditors, stated a good cause of action in a complaint
which charged the defendants, directors of a now insolvent corpor-
'SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) 374.
' CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §86.
" CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §87.
' CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §89.
"CONTRACTS RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, §§85-94.
'HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS (1925) 584.
It is well settled that courts will go further to sustain family settlements
than they will under ordinary circumstances, Baas v. Zinke, 218 Mich. 502, 188
N. W. 512 (1922); Trigg v. Read,;5 Humph. 528, 42 Am. Dec. 447 (Tenn.
1845); Price v. Winston, 4 Munf. 63 (Va. 1813); 1 PAGE, CONTRACTS (1920)
§623; Note (1925) 38 A. L. R. 734.
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ation with such negligence in the performance of their duties to the
corporation that a dishonest official was enabled to defraud plaintiffs
and others of large sums of money, and finally wreck the corporation
itself.'
Concerning the liability of corporate directors, the general Amer-
ican view is that they are agents of the corporation, and liable only
to it for their wrongful acts except under such circumstances as
would render them personally liable were they acting as agents of a
private individual.2 But some states have adopted the so-called "trust
fund doctrine" under which directors are liable as trustees of the
corporate assets for the benefit of stockholders and creditors. 3
There is likewise a split of opinion as to what conduct will render
directors liable either to the corporation or its creditors. Some juris-
dictions hold that the director is liable only for gross negligence or
fraud ;4 the majority that he is liable for failure to exercise ordinary
care and diligence in the discharge of his duties ;5 and a few, that he
1 Minnis v. Sharpe, 198 N. C. 364, 151 S. E. 735 (1930).
'Allen v. Cochran, 160 La. 425, 107 So. 292, 50 A. L. R. 459 (1926);
Union National Bank v. Hill, 148 Mo. 380, 49 S. W. 1012 (1899) ; Killen v.State Bank, 106 Wis. 546, 82 N. W. 536 (1900); Penney v. Bryant, 7 Nebr.
127, 96 N. W. 1033 (1903); Hart v. Evanson, 14 N. D. 570, 105 N. W. 942(1895) ; Young v. Haviland, 215 Mass. 120, 102 N. E. 338 (1913) ; THoMPsox
on CORoroIONs (3rd ed.), §1276; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS,§2558; MEcHEm on AGENCY, §§1467, 1474.
'Delano v. Case, 121 Ill. 247, 12 N. E. 676 (1887); United Society of
Shakers v. Underwood, 9 Bush 609 (Ky. 1873); Nix v. Miller, 26 Colo. 203,
57 Pac. 1084 (1899); Hauser v. Tate, 85 N. C. 82 (1880); and Pender v.
Speight, 159 N. C. 612, 75 S. E. 851 (1912) (holding that the directors are
trustees for the creditors as well as for the corporation) ; McCollum v. Dollar,
213 S. W. 259 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) (The directors of a corporation are
liable to its creditors for losses resulting from their negligent acts) ; Cam-
eron v. First National Bank, 194 S. W. 469 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917) (A
creditor has an immediate right of action against the directors.)
"Cohen v. Maus, 297 Pa. 454, 147 Atl. 103 (1929); Hart v. Evanson,
supra note 2; Peck v. Cooper, 8 I1. App. 403 (1881); Utley v. Hill, 155 Mo.
App. 232, 49 L. R. A. 323 (1900) (Directors not liable though they could have
prevented the loss by exercise of reasonable care) ; Aubrey's Administrator v.
Stimson, 160 Ky. 563, 169 S. W. 991 (1914) ; Spering's Appeal, 71 Pa. St. 11, 10
Am. Rep. 684 (1872) (In the absence of fraud or misappropriation of funds,
or realization of a profit not common to all the stockholders directors are not
liable) ; FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoarORATIoNs, §2573.
"Houston v. Thornton, 122 N. C. 365, 29 S. E. 827 (1898); Anthony v.
Jeffress 172 N. C. 378, 90 S. E. 414 (1916) ; Braswell v. Morrow, 195 N. C.
127, 141 S. E. 489 (1928); Besselieu v. Brown, 177 N. C. 65, 97 S. E. 743(1919) ; Moore v. Mason, 73 Ohio St. 275, 76 N. E. 932, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.)
597 (1906) (Directors are liable for failure to exercise ordinary care and
prudence); Cameron v. Kenyon-Connell Commercial Co., 22 Mont. 312, 56
Pac. 353, 44 L. R. A. 508 (1899) (Directors are charged with reasonable care
in the performance of their duties) ; Conaty v. Torghen, 46 R. I. 350, 128 A.
338 (1925) ; General Rubber Co. v. Benedict, 149 N. Y. S. 882 (1914) ; Mc-
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must use all he care and diligence that a prudent man would bring to
the management of his own business. 6 None, however, seems to hold
that he is liable for simple mismanagement or errors of judgment.7
North Carolina adheres to the "trust fund doctrine," and holds
directors to the care and diligence of ordinary prudent men. s There-
fore it would seem that the defendants, by their demurrer, have ad-
mitted facts which would render them liable under the North Caro-
lina law. The remaining question is largely a matter of proper
parties to the suit.
Even in states holding the "trust fund doctrine" it is usual to
require that unless there has been a direct wrong to the complaining
creditor the right of action against the directors vests in the corpora-
tion, or in the receiver, for the benefit of all creditors similarly situ-
ated.9 In case the receiver refuses to sue he may be made a party
defendant to the suit to the end that whatever is recovered by means
of such suit may be fairly distributed to all those having an equally
good cause of action.10 Strong support for this position is found in
North Carolina cases. And it is submitted that a more equitable re-
Ewen v. Kelly, 140 Ga. 720, 79 S. E. 777 (1913) ; Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U. S.
132, 35 L. ed. 662, 11 Sup. Ct. 924 (1891) (Directors must exercise ordinary
care in the discharge of their duties, and they will not be shielded from liability
because of the ignorance which is the result of gross inattention); Note.
(1919) 2 A. L. R. 867.
'Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 118 N. Y. S. 758 (1909); Hun
v. Cary, 82 N. Y. 65 (1880) ; (1910) 8 MIcH. L. REv. 137.
' By "simple mismanagement" is apparently meant that which arises not
from carelessness, but solely as a result of non-negligent errors of judgment.
The consequences of such mismanagement have something of the element of
accident in them since they could hardly have been avoided by the exercise of
ordinary care and skill.
'Bane v. Powell, 192 N. C. 387, 135 S. E. 118(1926); Solomon v. Bates,
118 N. C. 311, 24 S. E. 478 (1896) ; Caldwell v. Bates, 118 N. C. 323, 24 S. E.
481 (1896); Tate v. Bates, 118 N. C. 287, 24 S. E. 482 (1896) ; Braswell v.
Morrow, supra note 5; Anthony v. Jeffress, supra note 5; Besselieu v. Brown,
supra note 5.
'Douglass v. Dawson, 190 N. C. 458, 130 S. E. 195 (1925); Ham v. Nor-
wood, 196 N. C. 763, 147 S. E. 291 (1929); Bailey v. Mosher, 63 Fed. 488
(C. C. A. 8th, 1894) (Any liability of the directors is an asset in the hands
of the corporation, to be recovered by the receiver for the benefit of all the
creditors.) Priest v. White, 89 Mo. App. 609, 1 S. W. 361 (1886) (A wrong
done to the corporation which may affect its credit, and its creditors generally
is not a wrong to them as individuals, and they cannot maintain an action as
for tort); Kelly v. Dolan, 233 Fed. 635 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1916) (The right to
recover of the directors is a legal right vested in the corporation) ; Almiral
Co. v. M'Clement, 202 N. Y. S. 139 (1923); Lewis v. Council, 291 Fed. 148
(E. D., N. C. 1923); Allen v. Cochran, supra note 2; THoMPsoN, CoaPoR-
ATIONS (3rd ed.) §1375.
"°Douglass v. Dawson, supra note 9; Ham v. Norwood, supra note 9;
Kelly v. Dolan, supra note 9; THOMPSON, CopoRA.rioxs (3rd ed.) 889.
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suit would have been reached in the present case by the application
of some such principle,
The wrong complained of was not one peculiar to the plaintiffs;
furthermore, there had been an intervention by a dishonest official,
an independent third party, between the negligence of the directors
and the injury complained of. If, as here, the individual creditor who
has been injured as a remote result of the defendant's negligence is
allowed to recover for an injury not peculiar to himself without join-
ing the corporation, or its receiver, litigation will be increased with
the probable result that in such cases the aggressive creditors, and
those who are financially able to prosecute lawsuits will be enabled to
attach the available assets of the tort-feasors leaving the others to
such recovery as may be had from the corporate assets left in the
hands of the receiver. ALLEN LANSTON.
Criminal Law-Prohibition-Purchase of Liquor
Officers found a quantity of liquor, something less than a gallon,
in the defendant's room which the defendant admitted having pur-
chased for his own use. The defendant was indicted for transport-
ing, purchasing, possessing, and having in possession for the purpose
of sale intoxicating liquor. Upon a verdict of "guilty of purchasing
liquor," the defendant appealed, contending that since the Volstead
Act does not prohibit the purchase of liquor and the Turlington Act1
was adopted to make the state law conform to the national law, the
State was limited in its power to legislate more stringently upon the
subject than Congress had done. Held, The state law prohibiting the
purchase of liquor for beverage purposes is not in conflict with the
federal law which does not prohibit purchase thereof.2
The Eighteenth Amendment is not the source of power of states
to adopt and enforce prohibitory measures, but the power of the
states is that originally belonging to them and preserved to them
under the first ten amendments.s The concurrent power clause of
IN. C. Pub. Laws, 1923, c. 1, §2. "No person shall manufacture, sell, barter,
transport, import, export, deliver, furnish, purchase, or possess any intoxicating
liquors except as authorized in this act; and all provisions of this act shall be
liberally construed to the end that the use of intoxicating liquors as a beverage
shall be prevented." (Italics ours.) (An Act to Make the State Law Conform
to the National Law in Relation to Intoxicating Liquors.)
' State v. Lassiter, 198 N. C. 352, 1I S. E. 721 (1930).
'Vigliotti v. Pennsylvania, 258 U. S. 403, 42 Sup. Ct. 330, 66 L. ed. 686
(1921) ; U. S. v. Lanza, 260 U. S. 377, 43 Sup. Ct. 141, 67 L. ed. 314 (1922);
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312, 47 Sup. Ct. 103, 71 L. ed. 270 (1926).
